

# HARD PROBLEMS FOR CRYPTO

MORE NOTES FOR *SERIOUS CRYPTOGRAPHY* CHAPTER 9

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*We choose to go to the [factoring and the discrete logarithm problems] and do the other things, not because they are easy, but because they are hard.*

*(with apologies to) JFK*

(Presumed) NP math problems that are turned into cryptography

- Factoring
- Discrete logarithm (over integer groups)
- Discrete logarithm (over elliptic curves)

# FACTORING

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if  $N = pq$  and  $p$  and  $q$  are large prime numbers (with a few additional restrictions) then computing  $p$  and  $q$  from  $N$  is believed to be hard. Verifying a candidate solution is easy.

## A 67 DIGIT EXAMPLE

- Factoring 1 025 046 047 436 407 593 990 706 183 629 376 939 000 352 221 561 805 965 005 888 683 119 takes about 9 seconds on my computer.
- Verifying that that the factors, 868 112 830 765 445 632 873 217 196 988 651 and 1 180 775 137 873 020 977 354 442 912 336 269, are correct takes about 5 microseconds.

- There is no proof that factoring is hard.
- It is believed to be hard.
- Verification is polynomial. So it is in **NP**.
- There is no proof about whether or not it is **NP**-complete.
- It is suspected that it is not **NP**-complete.
- The best known algorithms are sub-exponential.
- The problem can be solved in polynomial time on a suitable quantum computer.

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# Hard problems for crypto

└ Factoring

└ Factoring complexity

FACTORING COMPLEXITY

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That is a worrying amount of uncertainty.



# THE DISCRETE LOGARITHM PROBLEM

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# WHY SO MUCH MATH?

## Question

Why are we going to go into abstract mathematics learning about the discrete logarithm problem (DLP) when it is so much easier to understand the factoring problem?

## Answer

Once we understand the DLP, it is easy to see how it can be used for public key encryption, while understanding how to turn the factoring problem into useful cryptography takes all the math of understanding the DLP and more.

The discrete logarithm problem is stated with respect to an abelian finite cyclic group.

## Hard problems for crypto

└ The discrete logarithm problem

└ The DLP lives in a Group

1. Sometimes, you will hear people talk about finite cyclic *fields*, but all fields are groups so don't worry about people saying "field" unless they are specifically drawing attention to it.

### Definition (Abelian finite cyclic group)

$H$  is an abelian finite cyclic group if and only if

- $H$  is a group,
- and  $H$  is abelian (commutative),
- and  $H$  is finite,
- and  $H$  is cyclic.

## Hard problems for crypto

└ The discrete logarithm problem

└ Unhelpfully stating the obvious

**Definition (Abelian finite cyclic group)**

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- *H* is a group,
- and *H* is abelian (commutative),
- and *H* is finite,
- and *H* is cyclic.

1. All of the groups we are talking about are abelian (commutative). If “ $\circ$ ” is the group operation than the group is commutative (abelian) iff  $a \circ b = b \circ a$  for all  $a$  and  $b$  in the group.
2. So far no one has followed my suggestion that non-commutative groups be called “cainian”.

Addition over the integers forms an abelian group because

- Addition is **closed**. Adding two integers gets you another integer. If  $a$  and  $b$  are both integers then  $a + b$  is an integer.
- Addition is **commutative**. If  $a$  and  $b$  are elements of the group then  $a + b = b + a$  is an integer.
- There is an **identity element** ( $0$ ) such that if  $a$  is any integer, then  $a + 0 = a$ .
- Every integer has an **inverse**. If  $a$  is an integer then there is some integer which we will call ' $-a$ ' such that  $a + -a = 0$  (where  $0$  is the identity element).
- The operation (addition) is **associative**. If  $a, b, c$  are integers then  $a + (b + c) = (a + b) + c$ .

Addition over the integers is an abelian group but it is not a finite group, and it is not a cyclic group.

- The number of integers is not finite.
- This group is not cyclic (we will get to what that means)



Bitwise xor ( $\oplus$ ) over bytes (sequences of a 8 bits) is an abelian group because

- Xor is **closed**. If  $a$  and  $b$  are both bytes then  $a \oplus b$  is a byte.
- Xor is **commutative**. If  $a$  and  $b$  are both bytes then  $a \oplus b = b \oplus a$ .
- There is an **identity element** (the byte  $0b00000000$  which we will just call 0) such that if  $a$  is any byte, then  $a \oplus 0 = a$ .
- Every byte has an **inverse**. If  $a$  is a byte then there is some byte which we will call ' $\bar{a}$ ' such that  $a \oplus \bar{a} = 0$ .
- The operation (xor) is **associative**. If  $a, b, c$  are bytes then  $a \oplus (b \oplus c) = (a \oplus b) \oplus c$ .

# Hard problems for crypto

└ The discrete logarithm problem

└ Bytes and  $\oplus$

Bitwise xor ( $\oplus$ ) over bytes (sequences of a 8 bits) is an abelian group because

- Xor is **closed**. If  $a$  and  $b$  are both bytes then  $a \oplus b$  is a byte.
- Xor is **commutative**. If  $a$  and  $b$  are both bytes then  $a \oplus b = b \oplus a$ .
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- Every byte has an **inverse**. If  $a$  is a byte then there is some byte which we will call ' $a$ ' such that  $a \oplus a = 0$ .
- The operation (xor) is **associative**. If  $a, b, c$  are bytes then  $a \oplus (b \oplus c) = (a \oplus b) \oplus c$ .

1. In the case of xor, each element is its own inverse. This makes xor magical and dangerous.

Xor over bytes is an abelian finite abelian group, but it is not cyclic.

- The number of bytes is finite (there are 256 of them)
- This group is still not cyclic.

# Hard problems for crypto

└ The discrete logarithm problem

└ Finite but not cyclic

Xor over bytes is an abelian finite abelian group, but it is not cyclic.

- The number of bytes is finite (there are 256 of them)
- This group is still not cyclic.

1. xor is cyclic on a per bit basis, but it is not for multi-bit sequences.

The group  $\mathbb{Z}_7^\times$  has elements  $\{1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6\}$ . The group operation is multiplication modulo 7.

Groups of these sorts are often written as “ $\mathbb{Z}_n^*$ ”, with an asterisk instead of a multiplication symbol. I will use “ $\mathbb{Z}_n^\times$ ” because asterisks are ugly, and because it better communicates that these are based on multiplication.

## Hard problems for crypto

## └ The discrete logarithm problem

└  $\mathbb{Z}_7^\times$

The group  $\mathbb{Z}_7^\times$  has elements  $\{1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6\}$ . The group operation is multiplication modulo 7.

Groups of these sorts are often written as " $\mathbb{Z}_7^\times$ ", with an asterisk instead of a multiplication symbol. I will use " $\mathbb{Z}_7^\times$ " because asterisks are ugly, and because it better communicates that these are based on multiplication.

1. The elements of the group are actually equivalence classes instead of actual integers. But I hope to avoid having to go into that.
2. I suspect that this is because the notation developed after typewriters but before  $\text{T}_\text{E}_\text{X}$ .
3. Mathematicians tend to write " $\mathbb{Z}/n\mathbb{Z}$ ". Many fields (all puns intended) in math make use of groups of that sort and have variants of their own notation, depending on the distinctions they need. In cryptography, we can get away with  $\mathbb{Z}_p^\times$ .

As a refresher, consider *addition* modulo 7.

Today is Friday. What day of the week will it be after another

- 7 days?
- 14 days?
- 7000 days?
- $7k$  days? (where  $k$  is an integer)
- 8 days?
- $7k + 1$  days (where  $k$  is an integer)

$\mathbb{Z}_7^\times$  is a group because

- It is **closed**. If  $a$  and  $b$  are elements then  $a \times b \pmod{7}$  is an element.
- Multiplication modulo 7 is **commutative**. If  $a$  and  $b$  are elements then  $a \times b = b \times a \pmod{7}$ .
- There is an **identity element** (1) such that if  $a$  is an element then  $a \times 1 = a \pmod{7}$ .
- Every element has an **inverse**. If  $a$  is an element then there is some element which we will write " $a^{-1}$ " such that  $a \times a^{-1} = 1 \pmod{7}$ .
- The operation is **associative**. If  $a, b, c$  are elements then  $a \times (b \times c) = (a \times b) \times c \pmod{7}$ .



$\mathbb{Z}_7^\times$  is an abelian finite cyclic group.

- The number of elements is finite (there are six of them)
- This group is cyclic.

# Hard problems for crypto

└ The discrete logarithm problem

└ Finite and cyclic

$\mathbb{Z}_7^\times$  is an abelian finite cyclic group.

- The number of elements is finite (there are six of them)
- This group is cyclic.

All of the examples for now will have  $n$  be prime.  $\mathbb{Z}_n^\times$  for non-prime  $n$  is something we will get to when we start going into the math needed for RSA.

# THE DISCRETE LOGARITHM PROBLEM


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## CYCLES AND GENERATORS

$\times$	1	2	3	4	5	6
1	1	2	3	4	5	6
2	2	4	6	1	3	5
3	3	6	2	5	1	4
4	4	1	5	2	6	3
5	5	3	1	6	4	2
6	6	5	4	3	2	1

Figure 1: Multiplication table for  $\mathbb{Z}_7^\times$

### 3 DOES THE ROUNDS IN $\mathbb{Z}_7^\times$




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## Hard problems for crypto

- └ The discrete logarithm problem
  - └ Cycles and generators
    - └ 3 does the rounds in  $\mathbb{Z}_7^\times$

3 DOES THE ROUNDS IN  $\mathbb{Z}_7$



I use TikZ so rarely that I need to relearn it each time.

When we multiply 3 by itself repeatedly, we *cycle* through every element of the group before reaching the identity element (1).

$$3^0 \times 3 = 1 \times 3 = 3^1 = 3$$

$$3^1 \times 3 = 3 \times 3 = 3^2 = 2$$

$$3^2 \times 3 = 2 \times 3 = 3^3 = 6$$

$$3^3 \times 3 = 6 \times 3 = 3^4 = 4$$

$$3^4 \times 3 = 4 \times 3 = 3^5 = 5$$

$$3^5 \times 3 = 5 \times 3 = 3^6 = 1$$

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## Hard problems for crypto

- └ The discrete logarithm problem

- └ Cycles and generators

- └ 3 is a generator in  $\mathbb{Z}_7^\times$

3 IS A GENERATOR IN  $\mathbb{Z}_7^\times$

When we multiply 3 by itself repeatedly, we cycle through every element of the group before reaching the identity element (1).

$$3^0 \times 3 = 1 \times 3 = 3^1 = 3$$

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$$3^3 \times 3 = 6 \times 3 = 3^4 = 4$$

$$3^4 \times 3 = 4 \times 3 = 3^5 = 5$$

$$3^5 \times 3 = 5 \times 3 = 3^6 = 1$$

For our purposes the distinction between “generator” and “primitive element” is not useful. So I am avoiding that second term.



## Definition (Cyclic)

A group is cyclic if and only if it has at least one generator that cycles through all members of the group.

## NOT EVERY ELEMENT IS A GENERATOR

When we multiply 2 by itself repeatedly in  $\mathbb{Z}_7^\times$ , we *do not* cycle through every element of the group before reaching the identity element (1).

$$2^0 \times 2 = 1 \times 2 = 2^1 = 2$$

$$2^1 \times 2 = 2 \times 2 = 2^2 = 4$$

$$2^2 \times 2 = 4 \times 2 = 2^3 = 1$$

## Hard problems for crypto

- └ The discrete logarithm problem
  - └ Cycles and generators
    - └ Not every element is a generator

When we multiply 2 by itself repeatedly in  $\mathbb{Z}_7^*$ , we do not cycle through every element of the group before reaching the identity element (1).

$$2^0 \times 2 = 1 \times 2 = 2^1 = 2$$

$$2^1 \times 2 = 2 \times 2 = 2^2 = 4$$

$$2^2 \times 2 = 4 \times 2 = 2^3 = 1$$

This generator defines a finite cyclic *subgroup* of  $\mathbb{Z}_7^*$  with elements in  $\{1, 2, 4\}$  while still using mod 7 multiplication.

Consider this equation where  $g$  is a generator of the finite cyclic group  $\mathbb{Z}_p^\times$

$$A = g^a \pmod{p} \quad (1)$$

If we know  $g$ ,  $p$  and  $a$  then it is easy to compute  $A$ .

Now suppose we know  $g$ ,  $p$ , and  $A$  and we wish to find  $a$ . This is written as

$$a = \log_g A \pmod{p} \quad (2)$$

and is called the discrete logarithm.

# THE DISCRETE LOGARITHM PROBLEM

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BACK TO THE DLP

## DISCRETE LOGARITMS ARE HARD

If  $p$  is chosen with care then the DLP is believed to be hard.

- There is no proof that the DLP is hard.
- It is believed to be hard.
- Verification is polynomial. So it is in **NP**.
- There is no proof about whether or not it is **NP**-complete.
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## Hard problems for crypto

- └ The discrete logarithm problem
  - └ Back to the DLP
    - └ Discrete logarithms are hard

If  $p$  is chosen with care then the DLP is believed to be hard.

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This slide should look familiar.

## QUICK EXPONENTIATION

Our example group is  $\mathbb{Z}_p^\times$  where  $p$  is 112 bit prime number

$$p = 3\,198\,594\,135\,065\,974\,402\,303\,823\,714\,395\,979$$

and our generator  $g$  is 2.

If we set  $a$  be some other 112 bit number,

$$a = 1\,729\,842\,084\,772\,514\,752\,626\,713\,784\,179\,499$$

it takes less than 20 microseconds to compute  $A = g^a \pmod{p}$ .

$$A = g^a \pmod{p} = 1\,142\,203\,535\,203\,822\,438\,059\,381\,484\,091\,159$$



Given  $g$ ,  $p$ , and  $A$  from the previous slide, computing the discrete logarithm  $a = \log_g A \pmod{p}$  takes more than 11 seconds.

# DLP IN ELLIPTIC CURVE GROUPS

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The cryptographically useful properties of the discrete logarithm problem requires a finite cyclic group (with a few other conditions on the group).

The group does not need to have integer elements and modular multiplication. It can be constructed from other things if it has the right structure. The term “generalized DLP” (GDLP) is sometimes used to talk about this generalization of the the DLP.

*Все [конечные циклические группы] похожи друг на друга, каждая несчастливая группа [структурирована] по своему*

*All [finite cyclic groups] are alike, but each unhappy group is [structured] in its own way.*

*(with apologies to) Leo Tolstoy*

## Hard problems for crypto

└ DLP in elliptic curve groups

└ Happy groups

Все [конечные циклические группы] похожи  
друге на друге, каждая несчастливая группа  
[структурирована] по своему

All [finite cyclic groups] are alike, but each un-  
happy group is [structured] in its own way.  
(with apologies to Leo Tolstoy)

1. I spent way too much time on this slide. Particularly because I thought that ‘*г*’ and ‘*и*’ were some sort of error from a bad font mapping or encoding. It turns out that these are the correct Cyrillic letter forms for lowercase *italic* ‘*г*’ and ‘*и*’.
2. I really should have this about *abelian* finite cyclic groups, but I don’t want to bother Tim with more translation requests.
3. Misquoted from *Ana Karenina*, which is less well known than his very Russian novel *Special Military Operations and Peace*.

It is possible to define a group with the right structure using elliptic curves. See the computation-examples document for more information.

The operation is called “point addition” and so the notation is different.

Operation	$\mathbb{Z}_p^\times$	Elliptic Curve group
Op. name	mod. multiplication $ab$	point addition $P + Q$
Repeated	exponentiation $x^n$	scalar multiplication $nP$
From generator	$A = g^a$	$P = pG$
Logarithm	Find $a$ given $A, g$ $\log_g A$	Find $p$ given $P, G$ <code>discrete_log(P, G)</code>

**Table 1:** Terms and notation for integer and elliptic curve groups

## Hard problems for crypto

- └ DLP in elliptic curve groups

- └ Notation wars

Operation	$\mathbb{Z}_p$	Elliptic Curve group
Op. name	mod. multiplication	point addition
	$ab$	$P + Q$
Repeated	exponentiation	scalar multiplication
	$a^n$	$nP$
From generator	$A = g^n$	$P = pG$
Logarithm	Find $a$ given $A, g$	Find $p$ given $P, G$
	$\log_g A$	$\text{discrete\_log}(P, G)$

Table 1: Terms and notation for integer and elliptic curve groups

1. ECs have a history in geometry, and so points are typically referred to using capital letters like  $P$  and  $Q$ , while in integer groups  $p$  is often used for the prime modulus.
2. When talking abstractly about groups,  $G$  is often used to refer to a group, but with elliptic curves, it is often used to describe the generator or base-point.
3. “Scalar” means ordinary number.  $n$  is a point.



Given a suitably defined elliptic curve group  $\mathcal{C}$  and a generator point  $G$  within the group and some integer  $d$ , a point  $P$  is easy to compute as in equation 3.

$$P = dG \quad (\text{within group } \mathcal{C}) \quad (3)$$

Computing  $d$  from  $P$  is hard and is called finding the discrete logarithm of  $P$ .

A carefully contrived elliptic curve group with approximately 20 bit security of

$$y^2 = x^3 + 522510265620x + 189830553521 \pmod{872078115079} \quad (4)$$

with generator  $G = (842965367165, 470264993162)$  computing

$$P = pG \quad (5)$$

with  $p = 266038276613$  took under 1 second, while computing  $p$  from  $P$  and  $G$  took about 25 seconds.

## Hard problems for crypto

└ DLP in elliptic curve groups

└ GDLP Assymmetry

A carefully contrived elliptic curve group with approximately 20 bit security of

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$$P = pG \quad (5)$$

with  $p = 266938276613$  took under 1 second, while computing  $p$  from  $P$  and  $G$  took about 25 seconds.

The software that I happen to be using is not nearly as well optimized for elliptic curve operations as it is for integer operations.